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The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures 
leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be ‘persuaded’ to change 
their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and 
distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly 
used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion 
phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet despite 
these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude 
change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, 
we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory 
distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that 
theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the 
occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events—compatible with a 
source monitoring approach—would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we 
argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the 
psychological understanding of memory distortion. 
 
Key words: Memory distortion; false memory; autobiographical belief; social 
influence; persuasion; attitude change; source monitoring 
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On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people’s memories no more than 
changing their minds?  
Many metaphors have been used to describe human memory: from computers, 
to libraries, to compost heaps (Randall, 2007; Roediger, 1980). Among the less-noted 
of these metaphors is the use of the language of persuasion when describing 
distortions of episodic or autobiographical memory. Belli and Loftus (1994), for 
example, claimed “the psychological literature [...] has shown that people can be 
persuaded to remember events that never took place.” (p. 415). Likewise, in a study of 
children’s memory suggestibility, Bjorklund, Brown, and Bjorklund (2002) wrote that 
“the suggestions and misinformation we provided children were sufficient to alter 
their answers but not sufficient to change their minds (i.e., memory representations of 
the witnessed event).” (p. 109). More recently, Leding (2012) issued a renewed use of 
this interesting metaphor, describing processes of “being persuaded into false 
memories” (p. 265). These remarks lead to a challenging and thought-provoking 
question: Are statements like these indeed only colourful uses of metaphor, or is 
changing somebody’s memory actually the same as changing somebody’s mind? In 
this paper we collate previous observations concerning overlapping findings in the 
memory distortion and persuasion literatures. We argue that whereas noting these 
similarities is important, few memory researchers have taken this endeavour further 
by embedding persuasion accounts explicitly in the interpretation or understanding of 
episodic and autobiographical memory distortions. Specifically, we argue that to 
realise the full potential of the mutual overlap it would be vital to understand how 
persuasion relates to memory change, and thus how these two fields of research could 
be better integrated theoretically. Through examining recent theoretical developments 
relating to autobiographical memory and belief construction as a potential foundation 
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for such integration, we argue that persuasion research could inform our 
understanding of almost every aspect of this metacognitive process.  
A tale of two literatures 
For decades, researchers have grappled with understanding when, how, and 
why a person will become convinced they remember events that they could not 
possibly have encoded themselves, or indeed that never even occurred. In other labs, 
meanwhile, other researchers grappled with understanding when, how, and why a 
person will be persuaded by particular messages. Evidence of theoretical dialogue 
between these two groups of researchers has been notably scarce, perhaps in part 
because of a tendency for the former group to identify as ‘cognitive psychologists’, 
and the latter as ‘social psychologists’ (Manier, 2004; Roediger, 2010). Even though 
some of the earliest classic empirical work on memory distortion took a social 
psychological standpoint (e.g., Bartlett, 1932), over time it may be that authors’ 
citation practices have reinforced and exaggerated the separation of theories from 
these two sub-disciplines (Tang & Safer, 2008).  
Whatever the reasons for this lack of dialogue, the notion that there are 
important similarities to be explored between these two groups of researchers’ 
pursuits and findings is not a new one. Indeed, as Leding (2012) noted, whereas 
persuasion tactics are not necessary to cause memory distortions or ‘false memories’, 
they do invariably seem to make such distortions more likely to happen. Both 
attitudes and memories, for instance, are changed more readily by credible 
messengers than by non-credible messengers (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; French, 
Garry, & Mori, 2011; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Pornpitakpan, 2004), yet these effects 
diminish over time as memory for the message becomes stronger than memory for its 
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source (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Underwood & Pezdek, 1998). Both attitudes and 
memories are often bolstered against change when a warning is provided in advance 
of an attempt to influence (Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997; Landau & von Glahn, 
2004; Petty & Cacioppo, 1977), but are typically less so when the warning is instead 
provided afterwards (Gerrie & Garry, 2011; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Kiesler 
& Kiesler, 1964). Both attitudes and memories tend to become more malleable in 
response to repeated influence attempts (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Weiss, 1969), 
particularly when the individual messages are similar but not identical (Mitchell & 
Zaragoza, 1996; Schumann, Petty, & Clemons, 1990). Both attitudes and memories 
are typically more resistant to change when held with high confidence (Babad, Ariav, 
Rosen, & Salomon, 1987; Wright & Villalba, 2012), but in both cases this degree of 
confidence is in itself susceptible to influence (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003; Tormala & Petty, 2002; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). In all of these 
cases, whether the target is an attitude or a memory, the end result is the incorporation 
of the message into the recipient’s belief system. In this paper, we will argue that 
beliefs may well be the key to promoting the interface between these disciplines.  
It is worth noting at the outset that when discussing ‘memory’ throughout this 
paper, we refer to the introspective judgment of perceptually re-experiencing events 
(as per Rubin, 2006, and Scoboria et al., in press). As such, our discussion does not 
explicitly extend to semantic memories, from which this sense of re-experiencing or 
‘mental time travel’ is absent (Rubin, 2005). Memory distortions are almost always 
studied through the lens of ‘re-experienced’ past episodes. Indeed, some researchers 
have argued that among all fields of memory research, the study of memory for the 
personal past has most to gain from borrowing from social psychological perspectives 
(e.g., Manier, 2004). This reasoning underlies the scope of our focus in this paper, 
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although the notion that attitudes are represented in semantic memory might well 
provide much further food for thought (Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1989). Our arguments 
could apply to many instances of episodic or autobiographical memory distortion, 
including those for simple stimuli such as words and pictures. For instance, we know 
that persuasion variables such as perceived source knowledge and the use of explicit 
warnings can moderate people’s susceptibility to falsely recalling unseen pictures, or 
members of associative word-lists (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; Watson, 
McDermott, & Balota, 2004). However, here we mostly draw arguments from 
research that concerns memory for directly witnessed or personally-experienced 
‘events.’ 
Toward bridging the gap. Based on findings that highlight parallels between 
the two literatures, such as those reviewed above, Leding (2012) proposed that 
research on persuasion could ultimately inform research on memory distortion, and 
indeed vice versa. We support this proposal and, like Leding, note that she was not 
the first to call for dialogue between the research literatures, nor to suggest that the 
two could be mutually informative. For example, Leding notes reasoning to this effect 
by Greene et al. (1982): 
The similarity between attitudinal and memory change paradigms may 
be conceptualized as follows: In the belief arena, a belief exists, a 
persuasive communication follows, and belief change results. In the 
memory arena, a memory exists, misleading information follows, and 
memory change results. (p. 208) 
Despite its clarity, Greene and colleagues’ argument did not generate much 
momentum. Sixteen years later, Strauman (1998) remarked “I have yet to find recent 
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studies of memory distortion from a social influence perspective” (p. 709), and noted 
that interaction between these fields could constitute “a fruitful marriage, or at least a 
healthy courtship” (p. 709) that might help our understanding of reconstructive 
memory processes. Another eleven years on from Strauman’s paper, Blank (2009) 
argued “Attitudes and memory traces have a lot in common”, but “[few researchers] 
have in my view exploited the full richness of this analogy” (p. 167). 
 A crude bibliometric analysis supports these observations. We searched the 
scientific database Scopus for all publications tagged with the key-terms “memory 
distortion” or “false memor*” that were listed from each calendar year from 1998 to 
2012 (N = 743). We then used the database’s search functions to check among these 
publications for use of relevant social psychological terms in the text, and finally we 
calculated the proportion of the memory distortion papers published in each year that 
contained each of those terms. Scopus revealed that the use of terms such as 
“persuasion” (3% of the sample, b = -0.0%/year, r = -.12, p = .67) and “social 
influence” (3% of the sample, b = +0.2%/year, r = .44, p = .10) were very rarely 
located in this sample, and with no substantive increases in use over time. Memory 
distortion scientists, it seems, rarely talk about persuasion. In contrast, there were 
significant year-on-year increases in the proportion of these memory distortion 
publications that referred more broadly to “social psychology” (26% of the sample, b 
= +1.2%/year, r = .68, p < .01).
1
 This result perhaps hints at an increasing general 
                                                 
1
Comparable results were obtained when a more complex search string was used, designed to focus 
more narrowly on papers that emphasised autobiographical and episodic memory distortions. In this 
case, we searched for papers which, alongside the original constraints, also contained one or more of 
the following terms in the keywords, abstract or title: event, experience, autobiographical, episodic, 
action, implant*, behaviour, behavior. Moreover we excluded papers that contained one or more of the 
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dialogue between cognitive and social psychologists, of the type that Roediger (2010) 
and others have encouraged, and may reflect the growing popularity of ‘social 
memory’ as a domain of study in its own right.  
Incidentally, it is worth noting that while memory distortion research might be 
becoming more ‘social’, current trends in persuasion research might simultaneously 
be bringing that literature closer to the memory distortion literature. In particular, 
there has been a shift toward metacognitive explanations of attitude-change, which 
take into account the confidence with which people hold their generated thoughts 
(e.g., Petty & Briñol, 2008; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). These explanations 
consider how metacognitive cues, including confidence, help individuals to determine 
whether an attitude is ‘true’ or ‘false’ – that is, whether the activated content is truly 
the individual’s viewpoint or is, for example, a reflection of popular culture (Petty et 
al., 2007). Clearly, this recent emphasis covers familiar and comfortable territory for 
the memory theorist, particularly with regard to influential theorising about cultural 
reality monitoring and the strategic regulation of memory (Johnson, 1998; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). Attitude researchers might, therefore, have much to import from 
studies on how people distinguish true from false memories. An instance of applied 
persuasion research moving toward the memory distortion literature comes from 
consumer psychology and advertising, where interest in false memories (e.g. 
Mantonakis, Whittlesea, & Yoon, 2008) has led to attempts to use memory distortion 
                                                                                                                                           
following terms in the keywords, abstract or title: DRM, word, picture. The search found 273 
publications, 32% of which referred to “social psychology” (b = +2.0%/year, r = .57, p = .03). Only 4% 
referred to “persuasion” (b = -0.8%/year, r = -.36, p = .18), and 5% to “social influence”, (b = 
+0.5%/year, r = .51, p = .05).  
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measures as a way of indexing individuals’ yielding to persuasion (Braun-LaTour & 
Zaltman, 2006).  
In light of the shared optimism among experts that the persuasion and attitude 
change literatures could strengthen and supplement our understanding of memory 
distortion (cf. Strauman, 1998), these indices of greater dialogue are promising. Given 
that reconstructive memory processes are likely to play a role in many of the effects 
observed in both the memory distortion and persuasion literatures, a healthy courtship 
between the domains may well lead to better specified and more comprehensive 
accounts of these reconstructive processes. 
The missing link 
The apparent scarcity of dialogue between the memory distortion and 
persuasion literatures, it seems, cannot be attributed to a lack of appreciation of their 
relatedness, nor indeed to a lack of interest in their relations. So what might be 
missing? We argue that the missing ingredient is likely to be a robust theoretical 
foundation for integrating the two literatures: one that permits us to move beyond 
noting similarities—as has heretofore been the extent of most theoretical discussion—
and to begin integrating knowledge. A similar conclusion was also reached in a 
broader sense by Blank (2009), who emphasised the need for a theoretical interface 
that would permit assimilation of findings between memory and social psychology. 
Considering theoretical perspectives, Leding (2012) outlined several ‘cognitive’ 
explanations of memory distortions, but singled out the Source Monitoring 
Framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008) as an ideal 
foundation for understanding persuasion effects on memory. Importantly, she noted 
that the SMF can account well for these effects, and argued that the SMF should 
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therefore be used to predict how various persuasive strategies would influence 
judgments of recollection. Before evaluating this argument, we first briefly outline the 
most fundamental assumptions of the SMF. 
The SMF encompasses a broad set of ideas intended to explain the processes 
by which mental experiences can be attributed to sources. For instance, when 
attempting to mentally reconstruct an experience, or remembering, we might try to 
decide whether a particular mental image brought to mind is a memory, or whether it 
is only a thought or dream. Alternatively we might try to decide whether we learned a 
piece of information from a TV show, or from a book. The SMF posits that memory 
distortions are the product of an imperfect and usually unconscious judgment process 
wherein mental experiences that originate from internal sources such as dreams, or 
from external sources such as informants, are wrongly attributed as having originated 
from perception, and misclassified as ‘memories’. According to the SMF, we employ 
a variety of strategies to distinguish real memories from internally-generated mental 
experiences. But memory distortions are particularly likely to occur when (1) a 
fictional mental event is especially memory-like – when it is rich in colours, sounds, 
emotional and contextual detail, when it feels familiar and plausible, and so forth 
(e.g., Bernstein, Whittlesea, & Loftus, 2002; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988), and (2) the rememberer is inclined to base their judgments on unreliable forms 
of information or reasoning (see e.g., Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 
in press). In short, according to the SMF, a memory distortion is simply a mental 
experience that a person incorrectly attributes to her or his own memory, rather than 
to an external or otherwise inaccurate source or influence. 
That the SMF can account for the effects of persuasion-like manipulations 
upon memory judgments is unsurprising. Despite evidence that memory scientists 
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rarely talk about persuasion, the SMF is explicitly informed by the principles of 
Chaiken and colleagues’ Heuristic-Systematic Model – one of the most commonly 
cited and comprehensive theories of persuasion and attitude change (HSM; Chaiken, 
1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Indeed, Johnson et al. (1993) quoted from 
Chaiken et al. (1989) in their seminal paper that formalised the SMF. Like the HSM, 
the SMF proposes that people adopt heuristic (i.e., rapid, low-effort) and systematic 
(i.e., analytic, effortful) means for making attributional judgements: in this context, 
for scrutinising mental experiences to determine whether or not they are memories. 
Moreover, like the HSM, Johnson et al. argue that the likelihood of people using the 
more rigorous systematic route depends on an assortment of motivational and social 
factors. Considering that this account of memory construction and distortion draws so 
explicitly on ideas from attitude change theory makes it more surprising that these 
two literatures have not been more intrinsically linked.  
In fact, researchers have long used the SMF to predict and explain the memory 
effects that arise when ‘persuasive’ variables are manipulated. For example, Bink, 
Marsh, Hicks, and Howard (1999) used source monitoring principles to guide their 
predictions about unconscious plagiarism: 
The evidence from the social psychological literature suggests that 
people tend to elaborate on or spontaneously generate implications to 
ideas that come from more credible sources as opposed to less credible 
sources [...]. From this [source monitoring] perspective, ideas from 
more credible sources might be better remembered because they have 
additional or more detailed characteristics encoded, and consequently 
they may be unconsciously plagiarised less often. (p. 295) 
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Elsewhere, Echterhoff, Hirst, and Hussy (2005) have drawn on the SMF to predict 
how explicit post-warnings would influence the misinformation effect:  
eyewitnesses who are postwarned may monitor the source of their 
memories with increased effort or stringency, as compared with 
unwarned eyewitnesses [...]. Superficial or lax source monitoring 
during retrieval impedes correct source identification, allowing 
memories of misleading items to pass as memories of a witnessed 
event [...]. According to this account, a postwarning reduces the 
misinformation effect because it induces eyewitnesses to examine the 
characteristics of candidate memories more closely at the time of test. 
(p. 772) 
In short, it is clear that the SMF is already being used frequently to predict and 
explain the persuadability of memory judgments. Yet the application of the SMF in 
such analyses almost always occurs without any mention of persuasion or of 
persuasion research, with regard to process, content or context. It is therefore unclear 
why an established and widely-adopted theoretical framework that can so neatly tie 
together the processes of persuasion and memory distortion has not already provoked 
a courtship between the two disciplines. Is the SMF insufficient as a theoretical 
interface? On the contrary, we believe that the SMF serves a crucial role in permitting 
theoretical dialogue between the two fields, as we explain shortly. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that memory distortion researchers have frequently used the SMF as a substitute 
for persuasion theory and findings, rather than as a theoretical interface that would 
draw the two literatures together. 
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Given the existence of an elegant theoretical framework that resonates with 
both domains, why has this source monitoring perspective not worked to integrate 
these literatures? One reason might be that the leap of inference required to make 
predictions about memory distortion based on persuasion research is at odds with the 
basic intuition that attitudes are inherently unlike memories. There is considerable 
variation in laypeople’s and experts’ understanding of the stability of individual 
attitudes and opinions (Fazio, 1995; Petrocelli, Clarkson, Tormala, & Hendrix, 2010; 
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001), yet most people agree that attitudes are constructs that a 
person might reasonably set out to ‘change’ in others. Indeed, entire industries—
politics, marketing, health promotion, and so forth—depend on the possibility of 
attitude change. In contrast, rather fewer people understand memories to be 
reasonable targets for attempted influence. Laypeople commonly understand 
memories to be analogous to video-recordings, etched as lasting physical traces into 
the brain’s circuitry and replayed accurately and reliably whenever they are activated. 
Almost two-thirds of US respondents in Simons and Chabris’ (2011) study indicated 
this belief (see also Clifasefi, Strange, & Garry, 2007); a similar proportion of 
California undergraduates in a more recent study agreed that “memories of everything 
we ever experience are stored permanently in the brain” (Patihis, Ho, Tingen, 
Lilienfeld, & Loftus, in press). Such ‘entitative’ characterisations of memory—as 
being a fixed ‘object’ or entity in the head rather than as a behavioural process—are 
clearly difficult to reconcile with the idea of those memories being persuadable 
(Blank, 2009). Of course, these naive conceptualisations do not reflect scientific 
consensus. The SMF and related theoretical perspectives typically focus on 
metacognitive appraisals of mental activity, rather than on memories as tangible 
‘objects’, and are therefore not entitative as such (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 
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1989; Rubin, 2006). Nevertheless, perhaps the reluctance of memory distortion 
researchers to draw upon persuasion findings stems from an implicit or explicit 
concern about making inferences that appear to rely on analogy or metaphor, in the 
absence of psychological theory that robustly links persuasion and memory change 
processes together.  
Recent theoretical accounts of remembering appear to offer room to 
circumvent this problem, allowing us to extend the arguments put forward by 
previous commentators on this topic and to more usefully conceptualise the link 
between the persuasion and memory distortion literatures. In these accounts, source 
monitoring errors are seen to represent only the final stage in a process of false 
remembering (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & 
Relyea, 2004). Crucially, these accounts distinguish memories from beliefs in 
occurrence, and we argue that this distinction is an important condition for better 
integrating persuasion research into a memory framework.  
From memory to belief 
Recent theoretical views stemming from the autobiographical memory literature 
have framed ‘memory’ as a construct that is subordinate to ‘belief in occurrence’ – 
that is, the truth judgment concerning whether or not an event actually happened 
(sometimes referred to as ‘autobiographical belief’; Scoboria et al., in press). In 
almost all cases, remembering something implies also believing it happened, whereas 
believing something happened does not imply remembering it (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002; Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., in press; Smeets, Merckelbach, 
Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). For example, a person might be led to confidently 
believe that she was once abducted by aliens, yet this does not necessarily mean she 
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will develop a recollection of the abduction. Conversely, a person who recalls being 
abducted should by implication also believe that it happened, according to this 
conceptualisation. More recently, memory and belief in occurrence have been 
characterised as fully dissociable constructs with unique phenomenological 
fingerprints, rather than as only partially dissociable constructs as proposed in the 
earlier work (Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, in press; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; 
Scoboria et al., in press). According to this framework, the judgements of believing in 
an event’s occurrence and of recollecting the event are two separate decisions that 
sometimes nonetheless inform each other. For example, Scoboria et al. (in press) 
argue that strong recollection should typically be used as a cue to belief in occurrence 
(see also Garry, Loftus, and Brown’s (1994) description of ‘memory as the 
justification of belief’). These current theoretical emphases on the belief/memory 
distinction follow criticisms of many earlier studies in which researchers claimed to 
have induced false memories of events, despite using methods and measures that 
arguably only assessed false beliefs about the occurrence of those events (see Smeets 
et al., 2005 for discussion). 
One consequence of the theoretical shift from memory to belief in occurrence is 
that it has encouraged many researchers to be more conservative when making claims 
about creating ‘false memories’. An equally important consequence has been that 
many memory researchers have become increasingly interested in beliefs in 
occurrence too, because they acknowledge that [1] believing is an integral and 
fundamental part of remembering, and [2] false beliefs, like false memories, can have 
considerable real-world consequences (see e.g., Brown & Marsh, 2008; Scoboria, 
Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2007). In other words, treating beliefs as distinct from 
memories has caused memory researchers to broaden—not narrow—their interests. 
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Beliefs in occurrence are not the only variety of belief to play important roles in 
memory construction. For example, susceptibility to memory distortions might be 
influenced by beliefs about the commonality of particular events, or about how 
memorable such events would be (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, 
Lam, Hart, & Schooler, 2006), or beliefs about the extent of correspondence between 
our recollection and the original event (i.e., belief in memory accuracy; see Rubin, 
2006). These other kinds of beliefs play important roles in memorial and meta-
memorial processes, and persuasion and attitude change research may be applicable to 
these too. For instance, Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) include an item in their 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire labelled ‘persuasion’, which is designed to 
capture respondents’ preparedness to accept that their memory is inaccurate if it were 
challenged. Belief in occurrence and belief in memory accuracy might sometimes be 
related; nonetheless here we focus on belief in occurrence, because there is now a 
considerable body of research devoted specifically to distinguishing this type of belief 
from recollection (e.g. Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 
in press). 
How does conceptualising memories as distinct from but related to beliefs in 
occurrence add to our understanding of the relevance of persuasion science to 
memory theory? Although persuasion tactics can lead to source monitoring errors, 
they can also lead to false beliefs that are not accompanied by source monitoring 
errors. People are, for instance, more likely to develop false beliefs in response to 
suggestions about events that ostensibly come from credible rather than non-credible 
sources (Scoboria, Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012), or when they are plied with 
information that makes the suggested event seem to be a common experience (Pezdek 
et al., 2006). It is therefore apparent that beliefs should be an important ingredient in 
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the theoretical development of a persuasion-informed memory science, as Greene et 
al. (1982) illustrate: 
The overall similarity between the two paradigms suggests that belief 
and memory change may function in similar ways, that is, variables 
that affect the process of belief change may also apply to the 
transformation of memory. (p. 208) 
Persuasion researchers clearly share memory researchers’ interest in beliefs. Whereas 
some researchers have treated attitudes as particular kinds of belief (e.g., Abelson, 
1986; Abelson & Prentice, 1989), others have conceptualised beliefs as being one of 
the building blocks of attitudes; specifically, as a ‘cognitive,’ knowledge-based 
attitude component that can be distinguished from affective and behavioural 
components (Ajzen, 1980; Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Rosenberg & 
Hovland, 1960). In both definitions, it is evident that the techniques and processes 
that govern attitude change are typically the same as those that govern belief change 
(Petty & Wegener, 1998). In short, changing beliefs is clearly strongly related, both 
theoretically and empirically, to changing both attitudes and memories. 
In light of the theoretical accounts of the relationship between belief in 
occurrence and memory, social psychologists’ accounts of beliefs as key components 
of attitudes invite us to consider that attitude change might have more in common 
with autobiographical belief change than with memory change. Here, a belief in the 
occurrence of an event might be conceptualised by attitude researchers simply as an 
instance of cognitively linking an ‘attitude object’ (i.e., the event in question) with an 
attribute (‘has happened’; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). A theoretical remembering 
framework that distinguishes beliefs in occurrence from memories therefore offers a 
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comfortable home for persuasion: beliefs in the occurrence of past events should 
follow the laws of persuasion more closely than do judgments of remembering past 
events. In fact, the crux of the argument here is that memory distortion might share 
similarities with persuasion precisely because memory change often follows from 
autobiographical belief change. That is to say, beliefs in occurrence are persuadable, 
and remembering can be informed by those beliefs.  
Evidence in support of the reasoning that persuasion primarily targets belief in 
occurrence rather than judgments of recollection comes in at least two forms. The first 
is that various persuasive manipulations tend to elicit false beliefs in occurrence, but 
only in a smaller proportion of cases are these beliefs accompanied by false memories 
(e.g., Berkowitz, Laney, Morris, Garry, & Loftus, 2008). Hence, a persuasive 
manipulation can alter the personal past, and perhaps the way people consequently 
behave, despite it not changing memory judgments. The second form of evidence 
comes from recent studies of non-believed memories. In those studies, researchers 
were able to use persuasive techniques to undermine participants’ beliefs in the truth-
value of their memories, without fully undermining the memories themselves (Clark, 
Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni et al., in press; Otgaar, Scoboria, & 
Smeets, 2013). These authors showed that the persuasive techniques left behind ‘non-
believed’ memory content that shared many of the same subjective and experiential 
characteristics as believed memories. Indeed, one study showed that these non-
believed memories occur commonly in naturalistic settings, often as a product of 
social influence from family members and friends (Mazzoni et al., 2010). Again, 
these studies demonstrate that belief in occurrence is more responsive to persuasive 
tactics than is memory. Future work that dissociates the two constructs in the same 
way might teach us more about the roles of persuasion in memory change. Indeed, it 
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is perhaps no coincidence that a recent paper concerning the belief/memory 
dissociation is among the very few that discuss cognitive dissonance concepts in the 
context of memory distortion theory (Scoboria et al., in press; for another recent 
example see Rodriguez & Strange, in press). 
A helpful feature of this theorising is that beliefs bridge the gap between the 
‘subjective’ and sometimes transient nature of attitudes and opinions, and the 
seemingly more ‘objective’, truth-driven nature of memories referred to above. When 
we conceptualise remembering as a process of activating physical and permanent 
memory traces, it is difficult to conceive of how changing a memory is like the social 
process of changing an attitude or opinion. Yet when we conceptualise remembering 
as a judgment process that is informed both by memorial and non-memorial sources 
of information about events’ occurrence, the notion that persuasion processes should 
play a role seems inevitable. Blank (2009) has used a similar line of reasoning to 
explain the importance of distinguishing manipulations that influence memory (as an 
‘entity’, to apply the terminology used above) from those that influence remembering 
(as a behavioural process; see also Manier, 2004 for an interesting discussion of this 
issue). It is important to further note that the theorising presented here is compatible 
with and consistent with the SMF. To illustrate this point, we now consider how a 
persuasion-induced false belief in an event’s occurrence might develop into a 
(believed) false memory. 
From belief, back to memory 
One of the theoretical issues targeted in recent memory distortion research has 
been to establish how changing people’s beliefs in the occurrence of an event could in 
turn change their memories. The answer to this question, in the framework outlined 
20 
 
here, should provide us with a clearer account of how persuasive tactics influence 
memory. As part of a broader theoretical model of autobiographical belief 
construction, Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) proposed one possible mechanism. They 
suggested that when people firmly believe that an experience happened to them, they 
might lower their source monitoring criteria for attributing mental images of that 
experience to memory. In other words, when an event’s occurrence seems highly 
likely and thus is highly believed, people are more susceptible to making source 
monitoring errors because they become more liberal in their judgment. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, numerous studies have shown that source credibility plays a 
crucial function in susceptibility to various forms of source monitoring error (e.g., 
Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980). In particular, Nash, Wade, and Brewer (2009) found that 
the capacity of fabricated evidence to distort episodic beliefs and memories could be 
largely accounted for by a credibility mechanism, rather than by other mechanisms 
driven by ‘cognitive’ factors such as subjective familiarity and mental imagery. 
An inspection of Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) full theoretical model permits 
us to outline more clearly how persuasive tactics might distort our memories through 
first distorting our beliefs. Specifically, persuasive influence will inform our 
assessments of an event’s likelihood of past occurrence, providing evidence and 
reasoning either in support of or against a suggestion that the event occurred. In 
Mazzoni and Kirsch’s model, this perception of likelihood is sufficient in itself to 
produce false beliefs in the absence of supporting memories, unless the absence of 
those memories is considered diagnostic that the event never occurred (i.e., “I would 
remember that, if it had happened”). We suspect, incidentally, that even this 
‘diagnosticity’ judgment could be amenable to persuasive forms of social influence. 
To our knowledge no study to date has explored this possibility, and this is an avenue 
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worth pursuing. Indeed, as we noted above, whereas our primary focus here is upon 
belief in occurrence, it seems reasonable that other metacognitive beliefs would be 
susceptible to persuasive influence. 
For false beliefs in events’ occurrence to be transformed into (believed) false 
memories, according to Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model, it might be that little 
extra is required than some reasonable mental content. That is, if judgments of 
especially high event likelihood can lead people to adopt liberal source monitoring 
criteria, then the only other necessary ingredient is something that can be judged as 
meeting these criteria, such as a clear mental image (see Hyman & Kleinknecht, 
1999). The generation and appraisal of this mental content should in many respects be 
independent of persuasive influence. Persuasion, we reason, should not affect 
people’s subjective assessments of the ‘goodness’ of their candidate memories: how 
fluently they come to mind, how much contextual detail they contain, and so on. In 
this sense, the persuasion literature does seem more relevant to the process of 
autobiographical belief change than to memory change. Nonetheless, persuasive 
techniques could influence the effort an individual invests into searching for ‘good’ 
memories, and into mentally elaborating upon the results of those efforts (see e.g., 
Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). In other words, although we probably 
cannot persuade somebody that their vague and sketchy mental image—for 
example—is in fact rich and vivid, nonetheless we could persuade them to try harder 
to find a mental image that is vivid, or to visualise and elaborate upon the sketchy 
image until it is richer.  
In short, we have argued here that attitude-change is more akin to false belief 
construction than to false memory construction, yet it is clear that even some elements 
of the transformation of false autobiographical beliefs into believed memories might 
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be susceptible to persuasion. For the reasons outlined above, though, we think that 
distinguishing autobiographical belief change from memory change—and aligning 
persuasion primarily with the former rather than the latter—will be the most fruitful 
way of encouraging cross-disciplinary dialogue. 
What is to gain from integration? 
 If the SMF can lead us to the same predictions and explanations that the 
persuasion literature might lead us to, then what use would memory scientists have 
for the persuasion literature? It is worth briefly considering what the persuasion 
literature has to offer that the source monitoring and false-beliefs literatures, at 
present, do not. We will outline just a few broad yet important suggestions, although 
many others can be envisaged. 
Interactions of key variables. A striking dissimilarity between the 
experimental approaches in both of these literatures is the level of complexity of the 
study designs used. In the persuasion literature there exists a philosophy that any 
comprehensive theory should be capable of incorporating the effects of ‘who says 
what to whom, how, and under what circumstances” (Lasswell, 1948, cited in Crano, 
2000). Consequently, many persuasion studies have used complex factorial designs 
that manipulate several of Lasswell’s factors within single experiments. For example, 
Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) manipulated source expertise (i.e., who), 
argument quality (says what), and issue involvement (under what circumstances) in a 
2 x 2 x 2 between-participants study. Other persuasion studies have invoked designs 
of even greater complexity (e.g., Chen, Reardon, Rea, & Moore, 1992). 
Consequently, an important lesson to be learned from these persuasion studies is that 
the effects of single variables on attitudes are usually qualified by higher-order 
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interactions with other variables. As Leding (2012) put it, “the field of attitude change 
became more coherent because these models helped to explain why different 
persuasion techniques were effective only in certain circumstances.” (p. 258). 
In contrast, autobiographical belief/memory distortion researchers are typically 
predisposed to studying just one or two of Lasswell’s factors at a time, no doubt at 
least in part because the experimental methods used in that field of research rarely 
lend themselves so easily to large sample sizes. As a result, it seems fair to argue that 
compared to persuasion researchers, memory distortion researchers currently have a 
less developed understanding of the effects of complex interactions between ‘source,’ 
‘medium,’ ‘message,’ ‘receiver,’ and ‘context’. Importing knowledge from the 
persuasion literature into our understanding of the development of false beliefs could 
improve our ability to predict how these higher-order interactions of variables would 
in turn affect susceptibility to false memories. 
Information-seeking. We observed above that both attitude change and 
memory change researchers draw upon theoretical frameworks that distinguish 
heuristic (or peripheral) from systematic (central) processing (e.g., Chaiken et al., 
1989; Johnson et al., 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). A key goal for persuasion 
researchers has been to understand and predict when people will use heuristic and 
when they will use systematic reasoning, as both processes can be expected to lead to 
persuasion under different circumstances. In contrast, memory distortion researchers 
have arguably placed considerably greater emphasis on heuristic than on systematic 
processes. This is unsurprising, because those latter researchers are interested in the 
production of errors, and heuristics are of course by definition more error-prone than 
systematic strategies. 
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The active gathering of information from external sources is one systematic 
route by which both attitude change and memory change can be fostered and also 
resisted. Participants in a large proportion of memory distortion studies have been 
provided with false suggestions about past events, but rarely have they been 
encouraged to actively seek out and aggregate ‘evidence’ to support or refute those 
suggestions as they might in ‘real-life’ (Wade & Garry, 2005). A small but growing 
evidence-base concerns people’s strategic use of external information sources to 
systematically validate and verify the occurrence of past events (Kemp, Burt, & 
Sheen, 2003; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Ross, 1997; Wade & 
Garry, 2005; Wade et al., in press). Yet it is noteworthy how little is still known about 
the role of information-seeking in the development or prevention of false memories. 
This situation is in stark contrast with the basic and applied persuasion literatures, 
where well-specified accounts exist of information-seeking, and of the roles of 
evidence in shaping attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Reinard, 1988; Reynolds & Reynolds, 
2002; Schmidt & Spreng, 1996; Verplanken, Hazenberg, & Palenéwen, 1992). 
Persuasion research, then, might direct the future theoretical understanding of how 
and when people seek and use external evidence to validate their memories. 
Behavioural consequences. The attitude change and persuasion literatures 
have a long historical interest in the behavioural consequences of holding a given 
attitude, and the extent to which people’s behaviour tends to change when their 
attitudes change (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; LaPiere, 1934). Relationships between 
episodic/autobiographical memory and behaviour are of course also well-established 
(Pillemer, 2003; see also Pezdek & Salim, 2011), but until recently the remote 
behavioural consequences of memory distortion were disappointingly under-studied 
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(Smeets et al., 2005).
2
 The last decade has seen a flurry of false-belief research 
wherein the dependent variables included remote behavioural measures, to augment 
the usual subjective memory reports ascribed by participants within the lab setting. 
One of the most successful of these research programmes involved researchers 
attempting to implant a suggestion that the participants had become sick from eating 
particular foods when they were children (see Bernstein & Loftus, 2009, for a 
review). Studies in this vein have shown that implanting false autobiographical beliefs 
can affect people’s behavioural intentions: participants’ plans to eat the specific foods 
targeted by the suggestion (e.g., Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). But these 
manipulations can also change people’s actual behaviour: participants who develop 
false beliefs or memories about having become sick after eating a particular food 
actually do eat less of that food when given the opportunity to do so (Geraerts et al., 
2008; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Bernstein, 2012). In fact, these findings prompted 
media commentators to applaud the birth of the ‘false memory diet’ (see Glassie, 
2005). 
The shift toward exploring remote behavioural consequences in false-belief and 
memory distortion research is particularly significant for the argument being made 
here – the social psychological literature can offer decades of theoretical and 
empirical guidance about the conditions under which attitude change leads more 
predictably to behaviour change (see e.g., Glasman & Albarracín, 2006 for a meta-
analysis). This literature could therefore be used to inform predictions about when 
false autobiographical beliefs and memories might or might not lead to behaviour 
                                                 
2
 We refer here to remote behavioural consequences to distinguish from immediate intra-experimental 
consequences of false remembering, such as reporting misinformation on a memory test, or choosing a 
higher subjective rating of likelihood after imagining an event (see Blank, 2009). 
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change. Indeed, one interesting and as-yet unanswered empirical question is whether 
memories per se do indeed guide behaviour, or whether it is the belief in the 
occurrence of those remembered events that is the active agent. 
Conclusion 
Researchers have discussed the many similarities between persuasion and 
memory distortion, and on this basis we began with a question: is changing people’s 
memories any different to changing their minds? Aligning persuasion with the 
construct of belief—rather than with the construct of memory—in the way we have 
described would imply that the answer to this question is “yes, but only slightly 
different.” If attitude change processes determine autobiographical belief formation, 
and those beliefs in turn can be transformed into believed memories, then changing 
somebody’s mind should be superordinate to—but highly associated with—changing 
somebody’s memory. However, we think that even this answer is a conservative one 
because, as we have noted, there are elements of the ‘belief to believed-memory’ 
transformation process that also seem amenable to persuasive influence. 
We join a growing number of researchers who have observed and argued that 
the persuasion and attitude-change literatures should be better integrated with the 
memory distortion literature (e.g., Blank, 2009; Leding, 2012). We argue that the 
growth of theoretical and empirical focus upon belief in the autobiographical memory 
literature will better allow this dialogue to move beyond observations of similarity, 
and toward true theoretical integration. The theoretical issues outlined here 
surrounding belief and belief change might begin to establish a roadmap for such 
integration; at the very least, these might advance an important discussion that has 
already been decades in the making. 
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